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ABSTRACT
Some recent theoretical accounts in the cognitive sciences suggest that prediction is necessary to
understand language. Here we evaluate this proposal. We consider arguments that prediction
provides a uniﬁed theoretical principle of the human mind and that it pervades cortical function.
We discuss whether evidence of human abilities to detect statistical regularities is necessarily
evidence for predictive processing and evaluate suggestions that prediction is necessary for
language learning. We point out that not all language users appear to predict language and that
suboptimal input makes prediction often very challenging. Prediction, moreover, is strongly
context-dependent and impeded by resource limitations. We also argue that it may be
problematic that most experimental evidence for predictive language processing comes from
“prediction-encouraging” experimental set-ups. We conclude that languages can be learned and
understood in the absence of prediction. Claims that all language processing is predictive in
nature are premature.
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Recently, there has been a wealth of research on the
importance of prediction for language comprehension
(e.g. Altmann & Mirković, 2009; Dell & Chang, 2014; Fed-
ermeier, 2007; Huettig, 2015; Kutas, DeLong, & Smith,
2011; Pickering & Garrod, 2007, 2013). Many researchers
explicitly or implicitly appear to support the notion that
prediction is necessary to understand language (in line
with recent proposals that prediction is a or the funda-
mental principle of human information processing, e.g.
Clark, 2013; Friston, 2010). Here, we examine whether
the role of prediction in language processing has been
overstated. Indeed, many linguists (especially within the
generative linguistics framework) have traditionally
argued that prediction plays no or a minor role in
language understanding because language users can
select words from a vast number of possibilities (e.g. Jack-
endoff, 2007). We would like to make clear at the outset
of this article that we are in favour of an intermediate
view. We suggest that prediction contributes to under-
standing in many situations because it provides a
“helping hand” for dealing with speciﬁc situations.
Language understanding, we conjecture, however, does
not always involve prediction and as such is not necess-
ary for language processing. Languages can be learnt
and understood in absence of prediction. We will restrict
our discussion to prediction in language processing but
will draw on evidence from non-linguistic research on
prediction when relevant. Our conclusions are (naturally)
conclusions about prediction in language understanding
and not necessarily relevant for prediction, for instance,
in object recognition or perception and action research.
Our arguments, however, are relevant more generally
to cognitive research whenever the claim is made that
prediction is necessary for cognition. If prediction is the
grand unifying principle of the human mind, then, of
course it must also be the unifying principle of language
processing. We ﬁrst critically discuss potential arguments
why prediction may be necessary for language under-
standing. We then provide arguments that prediction
provides a “helping hand” but is not necessary for
language processing. Finally, we discuss potential
avenues for future research on this issue.
1. Potential arguments that prediction is
necessary for language processing
1.1. Prediction provides a uniﬁed theoretical
framework for the cognitive sciences
Theorists such as Andy Clark (2013) have proposed that
“brains… are essentially prediction machines”. He
argues that prediction “offers a distinctive account of
neural representation, neural computation, and the rep-
resentation relation itself” and a “deeply uniﬁed account
of perception, cognition, and action”. However, it is
worth questioning whether we really need a deeply
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uniﬁed principle underlying all functioning of the human
mind? While Occam’s razor may support such uniﬁcation,
some scholars disagree and – so do we. In a commentary
to Clark’s article, Anderson and Chemero (2013) argue
that there can be no grand principle of brain functioning
because a complex organ such as the brain almost cer-
tainly uses a diverse set of principles. Sloman (2013)
points out that people, young children in particular,
often focus on extending competences and engage in
learning by exploration rather than prediction. There
are also classic effects in the attention literature (e.g. Car-
rasco, Ling, & Read, 2004) for which a predictive frame-
work makes either false predictions or offers no
explanation (see Block and Siegel, 2013, for discussion;
and Bowman, Filetti, Wyble, & Olivers, 2013, for a
similar point). Finally, Rasmussen and Eliasmith (2013)
point out that Clark’s uniﬁed framework lacks too many
implementational details and architectural commitments
to be evaluated seriously. The latter point, we suggest, is
particularly critical. Clark’s general framework about pre-
diction remains to be tested thoroughly (theoretically as
well as empirically) and is currently too underspeciﬁed
for it to be a convincing argument that prediction may
also be necessary for language processing.
1.2. Prediction pervades cortical function
Does prediction have a neural base which pervades cor-
tical function? Many neuroscientists and theorists from
related disciplines would answer this question with a
resounding “yes”. Karl Friston (e.g. 2010), for instance,
argues that the brain is fundamentally engaged in pre-
dictive coding and computes prediction errors, which
are assumed to bias our minds towards making correct
inferences. According to Friston, predictive coding
involves the minimizing of prediction error through
recurrent or reciprocal interactions among levels of cor-
tical hierarchy. Higher hierarchical levels are thought to
create forward models of lower level (cortical or subcor-
tical) activity. Importantly, lower level activity is assumed
to only contain the prediction error (often called the “sur-
prisal”, i.e. the extent to which the predictions are discon-
ﬁrmed) between predicted activity and actual activity at
lower levels. The prediction error is supposed to be used
to update the forward models of lower level cortical
activity.
The idea of predictive coding has become increas-
ingly popular over recent years also among language
researchers (e.g. Farmer, Brown, & Tanenhaus, 2013;
Gagnepain, Henson, & Davis, 2012; Lewis & Bastiaansen,
in press; Willems, Frank, Nijhof, Hagoort, & van den
Bosch, in press; cf. Chang, Dell, & Bock, 2006; Kleinsch-
midt & Jaeger, in press). It is important to note here,
however, that experimental evidence that our brains
engage in predictive coding during language processing
is very sparse. This may well be because the neuroscien-
tiﬁc methods available today have important limitations
and are (currently still) ill-suited to address this question.
One interesting proposal is that oscillatory activity during
language processing provides a measure of such predic-
tive coding. Alpha and beta oscillations are thought to
index top-down processing whereas gamma oscillations
are presumed to index bottom-up processing (Bastos
et al., 2012; Wang, 2010). More concretely, Friston,
Bastos, Pinotsis, and Litvak (2015) appear to suggest
that alpha and beta oscillatory activity reﬂects the
forward models of lower level (cortical or subcortical)
activity (i.e. the predictions), whereas gammaoscillatory
activity indicates processing of prediction errors to
update the predictions (see also Bressler & Richter,
2015; Engel & Fries, 2010; Lewis & Bastiaansen, in press,
for similar proposals).
What evidence is there that these assumptions are
correct? Prediction could potentially be involved in
syntactic uniﬁcation operations (cf. Hagoort, 2005,
2013). There are indeed some studies that have found
higher power in the beta frequency range in syntactically
correct sentences than in sentences containing syntactic
violations (e.g. Bastiaansen, Magyari, & Hagoort, 2010;
Davidson & Indefrey, 2007; Kielar, Meltzer, Moreno,
Alain, & Bialystok, 2014). This is consistent with the
notion that beta oscillations indicate syntactic uniﬁcation
providing a potential link between beta oscillations and
syntactic prediction. It has also been observed that
semantic violations result in lower power in the beta fre-
quency range relative to semantically correct sentences
(e.g. Kielar et al., 2014; Luo, Zhang, Feng, & Zhou, 2010;
Wang et al., 2012) consistent with the explanation that
beta oscillations are linked to predictions. However, the
direction of observed oscillatory activity appears to be
sometimes inconsistent. Some studies, for instance,
have found higher power in the gamma frequency
range for highly predictable words than for semantically
anomalous words (e.g. Hald, Bastiaansen, & Hagoort,
2006; Penolazzi, Angrilli, & Job, 2009; Rommers, Dijkstra,
& Bastiaansen, 2013) whereas others have found higher
gamma power for world knowledge violations and no
increase in gamma oscillations for semantically correct
sentences (Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & Petersson,
2004).
We acknowledge that there have been attempts to
explain these divergent sets of ﬁndings (i.e. the differ-
ences in the direction and nature of alpha, beta, and
gamma oscillations) within a predictive coding frame-
work (e.g. Lewis & Bastiaansen, in press). Moreover, we
cannot rule out that future research will provide



































evidence that oscillatory activity is related to predictive
coding (the line of work by Poeppel and colleagues,
e.g. Giraud & Poeppel, 2012, for instance looks promising
to us) but we believe that it is fair to say that the currently
available experimental evidence does not provide par-
ticularly strong support that prediction pervades cortical
function at least as far as language processing is
concerned.
1.3. Humans are adept in detecting sequential
statistical regularities in language input
Connectionist approaches to structure extraction have
provided compelling accounts that language learners
are skilful in detecting statistical relationships in
language input. In Elman (1990), for instance, infor-
mation about the distributional constraints on the
context in which particular chunks co-occur causes the
network to learn representations that correspond to
syntactic and semantic categories. This could be inter-
preted as the network learning from errors in its own pre-
dictions to approximate the conditional probabilities of
successive chunks within the input. Importantly, it has
been demonstrated that recurrent networks are able to
encode long-distance dependencies, which occur, for
example, in wh-questions and relative clauses.
Indeed, even very young language learners are skilful
in detecting statistical relationships in the input. Core evi-
dence comes from studies examining infant learning of
statistical dependencies in the input (see Romberg &
Saffran, 2010, for a review). For instance, Saffran, Aslin,
and Newport (1996), presented eight-month-olds with
a continuous spoken sequence of trisyllabic words
from a nonsense language (e.g. pabikutibudogolatudaro-
pitibudodaropi… ). Note that the only cues that could be
used to segment the words and detect the boundaries
between words in the sequence were differences in
the transitional probabilities of the syllables between
and within words, i.e. pairs of syllables within words
co-occur more often together relative to syllable-pairs
spanning word boundaries. Saffran and colleagues
found that eight-month-olds were able to calculate tran-
sitional statistics with regard to the frequency of syllable
co-occurrences and use these statistics to segment con-
tinuous speech streams without explicit acoustic cues to
the boundaries between words in the input. These
results could be interpreted as indexing infants’ predic-
tion of one syllable upon hearing another syllable
based on the high frequency of these syllables co-occur-
ring together in their previous experience. Alternatively,
these results could also be interpreted as indexing the
ease of infants’ recognition of frequently co-occurring syl-
lables, independent of any prediction-based processing.
Using eye-tracking in reading McDonald and Shillcock
(2003a, 2003b) also suggested that readers make use of
statistical knowledge in the form of transitional probabil-
ities, i.e. the likelihood of two words occurring together.
They presented some evidence that transitional prob-
abilities between words inﬂuence ﬁxation durations.
Frisson, Rayner, and Pickering (2005) replicated the ﬁnd-
ings of McDonald and Shillcock (2003a, 2003b) in a ﬁrst
experiment but, in their second experiment, when
items were matched for Cloze values, no effect of transi-
tional probabilities was found. Frisson et al. concluded
that low level transitional probabilities do not explain
prediction above “regular” predictability effects typically
determined by the use of a Cloze task. Moreover, accord-
ing to many statistical learning accounts there should be
interactive effects of frequency and predictability, i.e.
predictability effects should be larger for low frequency
than for high frequency words (Levy, 2008; McDonald
& Shillcock, 2003a, 2003b; Norris, 2006). In other words,
reading a low frequency word in a context in which it
is highly expected should be easier whereas reading a
high frequency word in a predictive context should
result in less of a beneﬁt (since it is quite likely to occur
anyhow). A great number of studies have failed to
ﬁnd such a signiﬁcant frequency and predictability inter-
action nor do they report any consistent trends
(Altarriba, Kroll, Sholl, & Rayner, 1996; Ashby, Rayner, &
Clifton, 2005; Gollan et al., 2011; Hand, Miellet, O’Donnell,
& Sereon, 2010; Kennedy, Pynte, Murray, & Paul, 2013;
Kliegl, Grabner, Rolfs, & Engbert, 2004; Rayner, Ashby,
Pollatsek, & Reichle 2004; Kretzschmar, Schlesewsky, &
Staub, in press; Staub, 2011; Staub & Benatar, 2013;
Whitford & Titone, 2014).
However, some evidence of a link between the extrac-
tion of statistical regularities and language prediction
comes from studies showing that performance in a stat-
istical learning task correlates positively with sensitivity
to word predictability when perceiving degraded
spoken sentences (Conway, Bauernschmidt, Huang, &
Pisoni, 2010; see also Misyak, Christiansen, & Tomblin,
2010). Despite this kind of correlational evidence that
individuals who are good at detecting statistical relation-
ships in implicit learning tasks are also good at predicting
language input, there is as far as we know currently no
direct experimental evidence available that unequivocally
links the detection of sequential statistical regularities to
mechanisms of predictive language processing.
Finally, and more generally, there is evidence that
random input can lead to the formation of better rep-
resentations of items than regular input. Tremblay,
Baroni, and Hasson (2013) presented participants with
long series of four distinct bird chirps, which were conca-
tenated either randomly or following strong transitional



































constraints. Participants’ task was to report the number
of unique chirps they could hear in the input. Participants
performed much better when hearing the random series
(a mean of approximately 4) than when hearing the
regular series (a mean of approximately 3.5). Especially
given recent ﬁndings that sharper representations
support prediction (cf. Mani & Huettig, 2014), the ﬁnd-
ings of Tremblay et al. raise questions as to the nature
of the linkage between representation detail, the extrac-
tion of statistical regularities and prediction. In other
words, if prediction is enhanced by the robustness of
the representations involved, and if the representations
formed in learning from statistically regular input are
less robust, then there may not be as strong a link
between the extraction of sequential regularities and
prediction in language processing after all.
1.4. Without prediction there would be no
learning
Even if one were to accept that prediction may underlie
infants’ learning of forward statistical regularities, the fact
that prediction may play an important role in language
learning does not necessitate that language learning
always involves prediction. Though Elman (2009) has
argued that predictive dependencies play an important
role for language learning, he has also stated that “pre-
diction is not the major goal of the language learner”
(Elman, 1990, p. 193). Others, however, appear to go so
far as to claim that without prediction no language learn-
ing would be possible.
Chang, Dell, and Bock (2006, see also Kidd, 2012;
Rowland, Chang, Ambridge, Pine, & Lieven, 2012), for
instance, argue that “abstraction occurs because predic-
tion occurs” (cf. Bates & Carnevale, 1993; Elman, 1991;
Hahn & Oaksford, 2008; Johnson, 2004; Lewis & Elman,
2001; MacWhinney, 2004; Rohde & Plaut, 1999; Seiden-
berg & MacDonald 1999). Chang, Kidd, and Rowland
(2013) also claim that prediction in language processing
is a by-product of language learning. These authors
propose that language acquisition mechanisms rely on
a form of error-based learning mechanisms and that
this error-based learning is prediction. The dual path
model of Chang , Dell, and Bock, (2006) includes a learn-
ing algorithm (the sequencing pathway, cf. Elman, 1990)
which compares predicted (next) words with words that
are actually uttered (i.e. production-based prediction, see
also Dell & Chang, 2014; cf. Pickering & Garrod, 2013).
Any mismatch (i.e. the “prediction error”) is used to
adjust the model’s representations. In other words, learn-
ing occurs when the model predicts the next word at
each point in the sentence. Chang and colleagues
(Chang, Dell, & Bock, 2006; Chang, Kidd, & Rowland,
2013; see also Dell & Chang, 2014) argue that error-
based learning can explain structural priming (Bock,
1986) and, importantly that “this ability requires that pre-
diction-for-learning is constantly taking place during
language comprehension” (Chang, Kidd, & Rowland,
2013). Syntactic structure is learned because the learner’s
syntactic representations are gradually adjusted in order
to be able to predict sentences. Chang and colleagues
argue that structural priming in adults occurs because
these error-based learning mechanisms stay on in proﬁ-
cient adult language users. Prediction in adult language
processing, according to this view, is a consequence of
language learning.
However, it is relevant for the notion that language
learning necessitates prediction that there is evidence
that infants (Pelucchi, Hay, & Saffran, 2009) and adults
(Perruchet & Desaulty, 2008) track backward statistics
in ﬂuent speech and that backward transitional probabil-
ities are often more informative than forward statistics
(see also St. Clair, Monaghan, & Ramscar, 2009). In
languages with grammatical gender such as German,
backward transitional probabilities are much more infor-
mative to learn which of the articles (i.e. der, die, or das)
precedes a noun because the noun is often paired with
the article whereas the article itself is a very poor predic-
tor of a particular noun. Similarly, Willits, Seidenberg, and
Saffran (2009) have shown in corpus analyses that back-
ward transitional probabilities in English are much more
informative for learning the grammatical category
“noun” than forward transitional probabilities. The track-
ing of backward transitional probabilities during
language learning and processing is therefore a clear
example of how language learning can take place in
the absence of prediction since backward transitional
probabilities cannot be used for prediction. In short,
the notion that all language learning involves prediction
is unlikely to be correct. Finally, even if prediction were
absolutely necessary for language learning, it does not
follow that prediction is necessary for language
comprehension.
Indeed, Mani and Huettig (2012) found that the (lin-
guistic) prediction skills of two-year-olds were signiﬁ-
cantly correlated with their productive vocabulary size.
Children with large production vocabularies predicted
upcoming linguistic input but low producers did not.
Further analysis showed that children’s prediction abil-
ities were tied speciﬁcally to their production skills
rather than their comprehension skills. These ﬁndings
are consistent with production-based prediction but
they are also consistent with the notion that language
learning can occur in the absence of prediction since
the low producers in Mani and Huettig’s (2012) study
showed comprehension of all the sentences in the



































study. It is important to point out in this regard that no
study conducted so far has directly tested whether
children can learn new words/grammars without predic-
tion. Future research could usefully be directed at this
topic.
1.5. There is a wealth of experimental evidence
that people predict in language processing
Last but not least it could be argued that there is a great
deal of experimental evidence for prediction and that the
sheer wealth of evidence for prediction in language tasks
supports the notion that prediction is necessary for
language understanding. We acknowledge that there is
much evidence that language users predict in many situ-
ations (e.g. Altmann & Kamide, 1999; Borovsky, Elman, &
Fernald, 2012; DeLong, Urbach, & Kutas, 2005; De Ruiter,
Mitterer, & Enﬁeld, 2006; Kamide, Altmann, & Haywood,
2003; Kutas & Hillyard, 1984; Mani & Huettig, 2012;
Nation, Marshall, & Altmann, 2003). Most of this evidence
for prediction, however, is not relevant for answering the
question about the precise importance of prediction for
language understanding. This is because the vast
majority of studies on predictive language processing
have used sentences in which the target word was
extremely predictable, i.e. very high Cloze probability
sentences (a notable exception is a recent study by
Wlotko & Federmeier, 2013). Further research with low
Cloze probability items is required to answer the ques-
tion of whether prediction is necessary to understand
language.
1.6. Interim summary
We have critically evaluated ﬁve potential arguments,
which could (and often are) used to claim that prediction
is necessary for language processing. First, we have
argued that theoretical frameworks that propose that
prediction provides a deeply uniﬁed principle of the
functioning of the human mind (e.g. Clark, 2013) are
at present too underspeciﬁed to be able to offer sufﬁ-
cient theoretical support for our question of interest.
Second, we conjecture that the currently available exper-
imental evidence does not provide strong support from
the domain of language processing for the claim that
prediction pervades cortical function. Third, ﬁndings
that individuals are able to extract forward sequential
regularities from speech tell us little about the extent
to which such results are driven by prediction. Fourth,
there is little support for the claim that prediction is
absolutely necessary for language learning. Indeed, evi-
dence for the informativity and use of backward transi-
tional probabilities suggest that language learning (at
least partly) takes place without predictive learning.
Fifth, most of the experimental studies on prediction in
language processing are uninformative with regard to
the question of whether prediction is necessary to under-
stand language.
In contrast (as spelled out earlier), we suggest that pre-
diction contributes to understanding in many situations
because it provides a “helping hand” for dealing with
speciﬁc situations. However, we conjecture that language
understanding does not always involve prediction and as
such is not necessary for language processing. Languages
can be learnt and understood in the absence of predic-
tion. We will now turn to arguments in support of this
notion.
2. Arguments in line with the notion that
prediction provides “a helping hand” but is
not necessary for language processing
2.1. Not everybody predicts
One source of support for the view that prediction plays
an important but not a necessary role in language pro-
cessing comes from studies ﬁnding considerable variabil-
ity – from no effects of prediction to weak prediction – in
developing language users (both children and second
language users). For instance, a number of recent
studies suggest that children’s anticipation of upcoming
linguistic input is strongly inﬂuenced by children’s voca-
bulary knowledge with differences between the studies
as to whether the driving factor here is children’s com-
prehension (Borovsky et al., 2012; but see Nation et al.,
2003) or production vocabulary size (Mani & Huettig,
2012). Variation in the amount of prediction of course
does not necessarily mean absence of prediction.
However, Borovsky et al. (2012) ﬁnd that children with
lower scores in a sentence completion task and children
with lower vocabulary scores both do not ﬁxate a related
target image even in a strongly predictive context, e.g.
ﬁxate the image ship upon being presented with the
context “The pirate chases the…”. Relatedly, Mani and
Huettig (2012) ﬁnd that children with low productive
vocabulary scores do not ﬁxate a related target image
cake in a strongly predictive context, e.g. “The boy eats
the… ”.
Similarly, results from older children (Mani & Huettig,
2014) and even adult bilinguals (Martin et al., 2013)
and adult illiterates (Mishra, Singh, Pandey, & Huettig,
2012) suggest that not all listeners anticipate upcoming
language input, and that anticipation of upcoming
language input – but crucially not language processing–
is strongly modulated by other factors, such as listeners’
literacy skills (see also Huettig & Brouwer, 2015). For



































instance, Martin et al. (2013) show that L2 learners do not
show a prediction effect in L2 processing. Here, partici-
pants were presented with sentences containing either
a predictable or an unpredictable noun at the end of
the sentence. ERPs were time locked to articles (preced-
ing the sentence-ﬁnal nouns), which were either consist-
ent or inconsistent with the sentence-ﬁnal nouns. For
instance, participants read the sentence “Since it is
raining, it is better to go out with a/an… ” where
umbrella, the expected continuation of the sentence
would be consistent with the article an and inconsistent
with the article a. L2 speakers did not show an increase in
the N400 to inconsistent articles, which suggests that L2
speakers may ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to use contextual cues
to anticipate upcoming language input relative to native
speakers.1 Mishra et al. (2012) compared language-
mediated anticipatory eye gaze to visual objects in low
and high literates. On hearing the semantically and syn-
tactically biasing adjective and well before the acoustic
onset of the spoken target word, high literates started
to look more at the target object than unrelated distrac-
tors. High literates shifted their eyes towards the targets
approximately 1000 ms before the low literates. Low lit-
erates’ eye gaze on the targets only started to differ from
looks to the unrelated distractors once the spoken target
word acoustically unfolded (cf. Huettig, Singh, & Mishra,
2011). In other words, low literates used information
from unfolding spoken words to direct their eye gaze
(ruling out that the anticipation effect in low literates
was absent due to “noise”, or that they understood the
sentences in exactly the same way as the highly literate
participants but somehow were less willing or able to
shift their eyes to the targets), they just did not use
such information for prediction.
In all these cases showing reduced or no prediction
of upcoming linguistic input in certain populations
(see Federmeier, Kutas, & Schul, 2010 for a similar argu-
ment based on reduced prediction in aged populations),
one would not – and could not – argue that these groups
of participants cannot comprehend language, i.e. extract
meaning and structure from linguistic stimuli at the fast
pace that language is typically presented to the listener.
Indeed, Mani and Huettig (2014) explicitly examined this
by testing children’s’ prediction of upcoming linguistic
input and the speed and accuracy of their processing
of non-predictive sentences against the background of
their reading skills and found that while participants’
reading ability correlated with their prediction skills,
there was no correlation between their language abilities
(measured by a standard naming task in the Intermodal
preferential looking paradigm, as well as a syllable detec-
tion task, a non-word reading skills task) and participants’
reading skills [see Hahne & Friederici, 2001, for similar
ﬁndings that proﬁcient bilinguals appear to be uniquely
impaired in their prediction of upcoming language input
(cf. Martin et al., 2013) but not in their processing of
language, per se]. Taken together, it appears that there
are a wide range of participants who show either
reduced or no anticipation of upcoming language
input (at least according to standard prediction
measures), but who are, nevertheless, competent
language users, at least in comparison to their predicting
peers. This would suggest that while prediction may be
important to language comprehension, language com-
prehension does not always involve prediction. Relat-
edly, however, these ﬁndings could also be interpreted
to suggest that participants who showed nil or reduced
prediction in the studies reviewed above were not pre-
dicting per se but rather that they were slower to
predict relative to the groups who showed more predic-
tive language processing. Thus, were we to give such
participants more time to respond, they would show
similarly predictive effects in language processing rela-
tive to the other groups. However, we note that even
were these participants to be delayed predictors, such
a conclusion would argue against a necessary role for
prediction in language processing since their language
processing appears to keep up with the pace of the
stimuli presented but their prediction appears to lag
behind. Second, we note that Borovsky et al. (2012)
ﬁnd that low predictors also performed poorly in a sen-
tence completion task where participants were asked
to provide a semantically and syntactically appropriate
ending of a sentence at their own pace. The poor per-
formance of the non-predictors in this study suggests
that these participants have difﬁculties with regard to
narrowing down the choice of potential candidates
that could occur in certain sentence contexts. Admit-
tedly, such participants also have lower vocabulary
sizes, which might be indicative of impaired language
abilities in general – which, in turn, would suggest that
one reason for their impaired language abilities is the
absence of a fundamentally important predictive
support system. However, a reduced vocabulary size
does not automatically imply that such participants
have difﬁculties recognizing the words they know.
Thus, word recognition – at the very least – can and
does proceed independently of prediction-based
mechanisms.
2.2. Suboptimal input makes prediction less
(rather than more) likely
Much is made of the beneﬁt of a predictive approach,
especially with regards to the processing of noisy or
ambiguous input. Thus, for instance, Pickering and



































Garrod (2007) suggest that prediction is a powerful tool
that listeners can use especially when required to
compensate for noisy input, due to strong top-down
inﬂuences on interpretation in such cases. In particular,
they suggest that the inﬂuence of production-based pre-
diction mechanisms increases inversely to quality of the
input. Evidence in favour of this suggestion comes from
studies showing increased top-down semantic inﬂu-
ences in the interpretation of implausible sentences in
noise (e.g. Gibson, Bergen, & Piantadosi, 2013).
However, recent research suggests that, if anything,
noisy or reduced speech input makes no difference or
prediction even less likely. Mitterer and Russell (2013)
investigated how Dutch listeners recognize past partici-
ples in which the preﬁx has undergone Schwa reduction.
They found that full forms beneﬁted as much from
predictability as reduced forms. This result does not ﬁt
with the proposal that prediction compensates for a
noisy or reduced bottom-up signal. More direct evidence
was obtained in a recent study by Brouwer, Mitterer, and
Huettig (2013). They observed that strongly supportive
discourse context led to prediction of the target word
only in sentences with well-articulated canonical word
pronunciations but not in the sentences containing pho-
nological reductions. This suggests that when listeners
are exposed to casual speech containing many phonolo-
gical reductions they may often be unable to predict
because they are more uncertain what they have just
heard. In others words, prediction can be very challen-
ging if the input on which to base predictions is poor.
2.3. Prediction is strongly context-dependent
While there are numerous studies reporting evidence of
prediction in language processing, we note that there
are increasingly more studies that ﬁnd considerable
context dependence in language prediction. Huettig
and Guerra (2015) tested this issue directly and observed
that prediction effects can disappear altogether when
participants are not given adequate time to view poten-
tial thematically appropriate targets beforehand. In this
study, Dutch participants listened to simple sentences
such as (translated to English) “Look at the displayed
piano” while viewing four objects (a target, e.g. a
piano, and three unrelated distractors, e.g. a plate, a
pig, some paper). Target nouns (e.g. piano) were pre-
ceded by deﬁnite determiners, which were gender-
marked. Participants could use the gender cue to
predict the target object because only the targets but
not the unrelated distractors agreed in gender with the
determiner. In Experiment 1, participants had a four-
second preview of the visual display before the spoken
sentence was initiated. These sentences were presented
either in a slow or a normal speech rate. Participants pre-
dicted the target objects as soon as they heard the deter-
miner in both speech rate conditions. Experiment 2 was
identical except that participants were given only a one-
second preview of the visual display before the spoken
sentence. A new group of participants predicted the
target objects in the slow speech but not in the normal
speech condition. These results suggest that whether a
language user predicts or not is contingent on the situ-
ation the comprehender ﬁnds herself in. Slow speech
resulted in prediction in both experiments. A normal
speech rate, however, only afforded prediction (using
gender markers) if participants had an extensive
preview of the visual referents. These ﬁndings are proble-
matic for theoretical proposals that assume that predic-
tion pervades language comprehension. We suggest
that prediction is deﬁnitely an important aspect but not
a necessary characteristic of language processing.
We note, however, that a potential objection to our
argument is worth discussing. Namely, the absence of
experimental evidence for prediction in certain popu-
lations (see Section 2.1) or in certain situations may
simply reﬂect the fact that, due to less experience,
some populations have less conﬁdence in their predic-
tions. The argument could be that prediction is always
occurring and that the output of the “prediction
system” leads to stronger (or more accurate or reliable)
or weaker (or less accurate or reliable) predictions
given prior context or experience. However, predictive
processing needs to reach a certain threshold level
before a behaviourally observable action is initiated. In
contexts in which the language user can draw on no or
less experience, predictions may be unreliable and thus
the “prediction system” may not initiate any action.
Such an explanation arguably is compatible with Baye-
sian implementations, which output the conﬁdence of
a prediction given the context, i.e. P(A|B). According to
Bayesian accounts, no action will be initiated when pre-
dictive probabilities are too weak. How could these
accounts explain the data we have presented? The ﬁnd-
ings that certain populations (e.g. older adults) do not
predict in certain situations could be explained by a
model whose connections were slowly damaged or
lesioned (Section 2.1). Consequently, predictions would
become less accurate and lead to less conﬁdence in
the computed predictions. Phonological reductions in
the speech input (Section 2.2, cf. Brouwer, Mitterer, &
Huettig, 2013) may also reduce conﬁdence in the predic-
tions. Our take on these arguments is a pragmatic one.
How fundamental is prediction to language processing
if it is so difﬁcult to observe in many contexts and popu-
lations? There also seems to be a problem with falsiﬁca-
tion (cf. Popper, 2014) here in that it may be impossible



































to falsify accounts which postulate that prediction
occurred in absence of a behavioural manifestation.
2.4. Prediction is (frequently) impeded by
resource limitations
Christiansen and Chater (in press) have recently argued
that processing speech input is severely limited, resulting
in a “Now or Never” bottleneck. Speciﬁcally working
memory capacity is assumed to shape the structure of
language perception and the solutions for dealing with
the problems imposed by the bottleneck. Christiansen
and Chater argue that “only an incremental, predictive
language system… can deal with the onslaught of
linguistic input, in the face of severe memory constraints
of the now-or-never bottleneck”.
We believe that they overlook that such a bottleneck
also imposes important constraints and limits on predic-
tion in language processing. Memory constraints and
sheer speed of incoming input mean that often there
are simply not enough time or enough resources avail-
able for prediction to occur. Indeed, evidence suggests
that predictive processing may actually be inefﬁcient
for select groups of language users. Rayner and
colleagues (Rayner, Reichle, Stroud, Williams, & Pollatsek,
2006; Rayner & Clifton, 2009) have suggested that older
readers adopt a riskier reading strategy than younger
adult readers, with older readers skipping words more
often, possibly on the basis of their guess of what the
next word will be. This ﬁnding could be interpreted as
indicating that older adults predict more than younger
adults to compensate for age-related cognitive decline.
On the other hand, Federmeier and colleagues repeat-
edly found that older adults showed smaller and
delayed effects of contextual constraint compared to
young adults, which was attributed to decreased reliance
on predictive processing in older age (Federmeier et al.,
2010; Huang, Meyer, & Federmeier, 2012; Wlotko & Fed-
ermeier, 2012). Indeed, it should be noted that the older
adults in Rayner et al. (2006), in keeping with the ﬁndings
reported by Federmeier and colleagues, also regressed
more to earlier words. Wlotko and Federmeier (2012)
speculate, in line with the argument put forward by
Peelle, Troiani, Wingﬁeld, and Grossman (2010) that
older adults’ decreased predictive processing may be
due to less efﬁcient functional connectivity, or that
predictive processing has become too costly or inefﬁ-
cient for older adults due to decreased availability of
neural resources.
Similarly, Huettig and Janse (in press) show that
prediction effects in language processing are modulated
by individual differences in working memory and
processing speed, such that participants with poorer
working memory abilities and processing speed showed
decreased prediction effects relative to others. Huettig
and Janse (in press, see also Huettig, Olivers, & Hartsuiker,
2011) suggest that language-mediated anticipatory
movements require considerable visual and spatial
working memory capacities in order for participants to
correctly encode and retrieve the range of possible
target alternatives that then guide eye-movements in
visual world prediction tasks. Further research is needed
to assess the extent to which prediction in language pro-
cessing is impeded by resource limitations.
2.5. Much experimental evidence comes from
“prediction-encouraging experimental set-ups”
We have already highlighted the number of studies that
ﬁnd evidence of predictive language processing (see
Section 1.6) and are convinced, especially against the
background of this literature that language users often
predict upcoming spoken and written language input.
We question, however, the extent to which evidence of
such predictive language processing is indicative of the
necessity of prediction-based mechanisms for language
acquisition and processing. This is especially so, given
the kinds of tasks that are typically employed in a
majority of prediction-based experiments. In particular,
we refer here to the fact that the visual stimuli presented
in visual world eye-tracking experiments on prediction
may provide critical scaffolding for the ﬁnding of such
effects. Typically such experiments present participants
with images of thematically appropriate and inappropri-
ate referents prior to the critical auditory stimuli (Huettig,
Rommers, & Meyer, 2011). Recent work on the visual
world paradigm suggests that children and adults alike
retrieve implicitly the label of visually ﬁxated images (in
line with cascaded activation accounts, Huettig &
McQueen, 2007; cf. Mani, Durrant & Floccia, 2012; Mani
& Plunkett, 2010, 2011; McQueen & Huettig, 2014;
Meyer, Belke, Telling, & Humphreys, 2007). Is it, therefore,
worth asking whether participants anticipate themati-
cally appropriate targets to a similar extent when these
targets are not displayed in front of them?
Some visual world eye-tracking work suggests that
there is prediction of upcoming linguistic input even
when appropriate targets are not present in the visual
display (Rommers, Meyer, Praamstra, & Huettig, 2013).
Thus, Rommers et al. (2013) ﬁnd that participants ﬁxate
images overlapping in shape with the intended targets,
e.g. a round object, upon hearing contextually constrain-
ing sentences such as “In 1969 Neil Armstrong was the
ﬁrst man to set foot on the moon”, even before they
hear the word “moon” and in the absence of any visual
referent of the target “moon”. Nevertheless, we suggest



































that while there might be a component to prediction that
is uninﬂuenced by the visual context provided in typical
prediction tasks, it is worth examining the extent to
which the strength of the prediction effects reported in
the literature can be attributed to the visual presentation
of the appropriate target.
On the other hand, it is certainly true that during every
day interactions, prediction in language processing is
often akin to choosing among several pre-activated refer-
ents. Natural conversation is frequently about things in the
here and now. However, in order to argue that prediction
is a necessary characteristic of language processing, it is
important that we distinguish between purely language-
based prediction effects and language-mediated antici-
patory eye-movements (and changes in brain activity)
whichmay be led by the presentation of isolated themati-
cally appropriate images.
Another issue regarding the nature of commonly used
prediction tasks, especially against the background of
working memory constraints on prediction discussed in
Section 2.4, concerns the kind of stimuli that are typically
presented to participants in such paradigms. Typically,
the auditory stimuli used are perfectly articulated sen-
tences presented in a slow speaking rate in order to
allow adequate time for participants to initiate predictive
eye-movements. Indeed, this is especially the case in
studies with young children. Given that working
memory capacities and cognitive efﬁciency impact pre-
diction performance even in such ideal situations
(Huettig & Janse, in press), it is worth questioning the
extent to which prediction performance in natural con-
versation is impacted by working memory and proces-
sing speed abilities. This is especially so given the
differences in the quality of auditory and visual input
provided in natural conversations compared to the
ideal prediction tasks.
Finally, note that methodological worries about the
generalisability of the available evidence for predictive
language processing are not restricted to visual world
eye-tracking. Most electrophysiological studies (another
method of choice to investigate predictive language pro-
cessing) present written sentences word by word in a
(often slow) manner far removed from normal reading
situations. Given that (in addition) the vast majorities of
ERP studies measure the electrophysiological sign of
anticipation (e.g. a reduced N400 ERP component)
during the target word only (and not before), it cannot
be ruled out that many studies have measured word
integration difﬁculties rather than prediction (but see
DeLong et al., 2005; Van Berkum, Brown, Zwitserlood,
Kooijman, & Hagoort, 2005; Wicha, Moreno, & Kutas,
2004; for important exceptions to this).
2.6. Interim summary
We have presented ﬁve arguments that question the
claim that prediction is a necessary part of language
processing. In particular, we present evidence that not
all language users predict, drawing mainly from studies
with developing (i.e. children and adult second language
learners) and illiterate language users. We also suggest
that prediction effects may be highly dependent on
the context in which they are obtained, showing – on
the one hand – that prediction effects may disappear
in contexts where participants are not provided required
scaffolding in the form of slower speech or sufﬁcient
time to view possible alternatives and – on the other
hand – that studies reporting robust prediction effects
tend to provide participants with prediction-encoura-
ging paradigms that question the extent to which pre-
diction underlies natural language processing. We also
discuss that – contrary to claims that predictive language
use may aid processing of noisy input – prediction may
actually be reduced given noisy input, or increased
working memory demands. We interpret these argu-
ments in the following manner: While we believe that
language users do often predict upcoming input, we
do not believe there is sufﬁcient evidence for the claim
that prediction is a necessary characteristic of language
use. The population, context and resource-dependence
of prediction effects in the literature strongly suggest
that successful language processing can and does take
place in the absence of prediction.
3. The way forward
We suggest that further resolution of this debate requires
more focus on understanding why prediction effects are
not found in some studies, in contrast to the large
number of studies that ﬁnd reliable prediction effects.
In particular, we suggest it is important that future
research more rigidly examines the factors contributing
to differences across the two groups of studies. For
instance, if prediction effects are not found in certain
populations, to what extent do these populations also
suffer from impoverished language skills or general cog-
nitive skills that might explain the absence of robust pre-
diction effects? Or if prediction effects are scaffold by
certain tasks, or certain kinds of stimuli or working
memory demands, then to what extent is such scaffold-
ing provided in natural conversation and how does
language processing in natural conversation proceed
without such scaffolding (and consequently without pre-
dictive processing). We believe therefore that it is critical
that research on prediction in language processing



































focuses more on “real world” situations. Important fea-
tures of natural settings are casual speech and language
which often has a low Cloze probability. Finally, on a
different note, if research continues to suggest that pre-
diction is necessary for language processing, e.g. with
regard to language acquisition, or the learning of statisti-
cal regularities, it is critical that this work more accurately
outlines the precise contribution of prediction to these
processes and the extent to which they may be depen-
dent or independent from prediction.
4. Conclusion
In sum, we believe that there are signiﬁcant constraints
for claims that prediction is necessary for language
understanding. We conclude that claims that all language
processing is predictive in nature are premature. Some-
times, processing words when they occur may be more
efﬁcient and economical than predicting them.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the authors.
Note
1. Note that L2 speakers did show differences in ERPs time-
locked to the ﬁnal noun, where the Cloze probability of
expected nouns was higher than that of unexpected nouns
(e.g. a raincoat in the example above). Here, L2 speakers,
similar to L1 speakers, showed an N400 effect time-locked
to the onset of the noun. This ﬁnding is not, however,
evidence for prediction, and could merely index the ease of
integration of a high Cloze probability word in a sentence
context following presentation of the word. Indeed, the
authors conclude, on the basis of the results reported
above, that L2 readers do not predict upcoming words in a
sentence context.
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